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Handling of Facts in Cicero’s Speech 
in Defence of Quintus Ligarius
TAMÁS NÓTÁRI
Abstract. After the battle of Thapsus that took place on 6 April 46 Caesar kept delaying his return to Rome for a 
long while, until 25 July – he stopped to stay on Sardinia – and this cannot be attributed fully to implementing 
measures and actions necessary in Africa since they could have been carried out by his new proconsul, C. 
Sallustius Crispus too. The triumph held owing to the victory in Africa – in which they carried around 
representations of the death  of M. Petreius, M. Porcius Cato and Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica – must 
have further grated on the nerves of the aristocracy of Rome, because it was meant to symbolise Caesar’s victory 
both over Iuba and the senate. It was after that that Cicero broke his silence and delivered Pro Marcello in the 
senate, which was both oratio suasoria and gratiarum actio for the pardon granted to Marcellus, by which Caesar 
wanted to assure the senate of his benevolence and wanted to show off his power by his autocratic gesture. Pro 
Ligario delivered in 46 has been considered a classical example of deprecatio by both the antique and modern 
literature, and in historical terms it is not a less noteworthy work since from the period following the civil war Pro 
Marcello, having been delivered in early autumn of 46 in the senate, is Cicero’s fi rst oration made on the Forum, 
that is, before the general public, in which praising Caesar’s clementia he seemingly legitimised dictatorship. First, 
we describe the historical background of the oratio and the process of the proceedings (I.); then, we examine the 
issue if the proceedings against Ligarius can be considered a real criminal trial. (II.) After the analysis of the genre 
of the speech, deprecatio (III.) we analyse the appearance of Caesar’s clementia in Pro Ligario. (IV.) Finally, we 
focus on the means of style of irony, and highlight an interesting element of the Caesar–Cicero relation and how 
the orator voices his conviction that he considers the dictator’s power and clementia illegitimate. (V.)
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I 
Quintus Ligarius – who was born as the offspring of an insignifi cant Sabine gens, his 
brother, Titus fulfi lled the offi ce of quaestor urbanus around 54, his other brother, Quintus 
obtained quaestorship sometimes in the 50’s – fi lled the offi ce of legate in 50 beside 
Considius Longus propraetor in the Africa province1 (Broughton 1951–1960: II. 223, 581; 
III. 35). After Considius went to Rome at the end of 50 to run as candidate for consulate, 
the administration of the province was left to Ligarius, who – as Cicero asserts – was not 
pleased to undertake it.2 Immediately before the outbreak of the civil war, in 49 the senate 
appointed Q. Aelius Tubero, Cicero’s remote relative, propraetor of Africa, who waited 
before taking over the province – we do not know whether his illness prevented him from 
travelling or he wanted to wait and see what direction high politics would take. In Africa 
1 Cicero, Pro Ligario 2.
2 Ibid. 2.
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Ligarius also took a wait-and-see attitude. That is how it happened that not long after the 
outbreak of the civil war – after the defeat by Caesar at Auximum – before the propraetor 
designated by the senate, P. Attius Varus, Pompey’s adherent, Africa’s one-time governor 
arrived in Utica,3 who arbitrarily took over the governance of the province on behalf of the 
republican side and ordered to set up two legions.4 Ligarius was compelled to subordinate 
himself to Varus’s supremacy; however, both Cicero and Caesar disputed its validity as 
Varus’s procedure lacked lawful grounds5 (Walser 1959: 90).
Soon, in the spring of 49 – the exact date is not known, it might have taken place after 
Cato’s withdrawal from Sicily, i.e., 23 April – Africa’s legitimate governor, Q. Aelius 
Tubero, together with his son appeared at Utica.6 Tubero was prohibited by Varus and 
Ligarius, exercising administration along the coast of Africa, to land and take over the 
province assigned to him by the senate as well as to take water and get his ill son to enter 
the province.7 In the plea of defence Cicero shifted the responsibility for the above onto 
Varus.8 Regarding these events Caesar did not mention Ligarius’s name either, only 
Varus’s.9 The exact cause of the hostile conduct engaged by Varus and Ligarius are not 
known, their distrust was most probably due to the fact that Tubero kept delaying his 
journey to Africa and they suspected him of belonging to Caesar’s adherents. After that, 
Tubero joined Pompey in Greece, and took part in the battle at Pharsalus on his side; then, 
he was granted pardon by Caesar (Walser 1959: 91; McDermott 1970: 321).
In the meantime, Caesar’s commander, Curio commanded troops to Africa in August 
49, and after the victories over Varus and Ligarius he died in the battle against the ruler of 
Numida, Iuba. Only a few of Curio’s army, including Asinius Pollio, were able to escape to 
Sicily. Iuba considered himself absolute winner and had a part of the Roman soldiers who 
surrendered to Varus executed. Although Varus did not approve this step, he was not in the 
situation to oppose it.10 As Iuba appeared to be the republican forces’ most signifi cant 
support in Africa, the Pompeian senate awarded him the title of king and hospitality, while 
the Caesarian senate declared him enemy (hostis populi Romani). After the battle at 
Pharsalus Pompey’s adherents gathered in Africa to continue the fi ght against Caesar; the 
offi ce of the commander-in-chief was given on the grounds of Cato’s decision to Pompey’s 
father-in-law, the consul of the year 52, Q. Metellus Scipio. Attius Varus, Labienus and 
Cato submitted themselves to Metellus Scipio, however, internal hostility mostly worn out 
the force of opposition and, to a considerable extent, facilitated Caesar’s victory in Africa in 
46. Cato proudly took his own life and deprived Caesar from the opportunity of exercising 
power – punishment or pardon – over him, Attius Varus and Labienus moved to Hispania, 
and continued the fi ght there up to 45 (Walser 1959: 91; McDermott 1970: 321).
After the battle at Thapsus Ligarius was taken as captive in Hadrimentum, however, 
Caesar gave him pardon just as to Considius’s son.11 From the fact of captivity in 
Hadrimentum it is possible to draw the conclusion that Ligarius stayed there during the 
3 Ibid. 3; Caesar, De bello civili 1, 31, 2.
4 Caesar, De bello civili 1, 31, 2.
5 Cicero, Pro Ligario 3; Caesar, De bello civili 1, 31, 2.
6 Cicero, Pro Ligario 27.
7 Pomponius, Digesta Iustiniani 1, 2, 2, 46.
8 Cicero, Pro Ligario 22.
9 Caesar, De bello civili 1, 31, 3.
10 Caesar, De bello civili 2, 44.
11 Bellum Africanum 89.
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entire term of the war in Africa and did not assume any part in war actions; yet, he could 
not have been a really signifi cant person since the author of Bellum Africanum does not 
mention him by name. Caesar’s pardon was not rare at all as the dictator gave amnesty to 
everybody who surrendered without fi ght in the war in Africa; only a few even of the chiefs 
were killed, e.g. Afranius and Faustus Sulla captivated during fi ght – whether it was done 
on the direct orders of Caesar12 or without his knowledge is disputed.13 This is fully 
supported by Cicero’s statement when he speaks about a victory where only armed persons 
were killed.14 However, a granted pardon did not give permit to return to Italy. 
Ligarius’s relatives turned to Cicero as early as in the summer of 46 asking him to use 
his infl uence with Caesar to allow Ligarius to return to Italy, and in letters with highly 
offi cial tone dated in August and September 46 respectively – which does not certify that 
they maintained any friendly relation – the orator assured Ligarius of his help.15 It is not 
known what kind of relationship Cicero maintained with the otherwise not too signifi cant 
Ligarii known only for their hostile emotions towards Caesar and what role Cicero’s 
ceaseless fi nancial diffi culties played in undertaking the case. It is possible that it was 
Brutus’s mediation that made Cicero undertake the case. On the other hand, for a long while 
Cicero did not have any direct contact with the dictator, only with his environment, e.g. 
with Pansa, Hirtius and Postumus.16 In Ligarius’s matter, together with Ligarius’s brothers 
he made efforts to get close to Caesar through mediators and disclose the matter to him.17 
This was not an easy task because, among others, Caesar took a dislike to those who were 
involved in the war in Africa and wanted to keep them in uncertainty by delaying their 
return;18 Cicero encouraged Ligarius by asserting that his troubles would be soon solved for 
Caesar’s anger lessened from day to day.19 His next letter more resolutely voiced the hope 
in the opportunity of returning home soon20 as having undertaken the somewhat humiliating 
situation to ask for audience as a senator consularis from Caesar four years younger than 
him, not being above him at all in the hierarchy of the Republic, Cicero was granted 
personal hearing by Caesar where he appeared together with Ligarius’s brothers, who threw 
themselves to the ground at the dictator’s feet, and Cicero delivered a speech.21 To all that 
Caesar responded generously, which made giving amnesty unquestionable in Cicero’s eyes, 
however, it could not be considered a completed fact (Walser 1959: 92; Mc Dermott 1970: 
321 ff.).
So, Ligarius’s case was in a fair way to get solved to satisfy everybody when in the 
last days of September 46 the son of Lucius Tubero, the former governor, Q. Aelius Tubero 
brought a charge against Ligarius, which he wanted to support primarily by asserting that 
Ligarius – and Varus – had not let him land in Africa, in the province assigned to them by 
the senate (Kunkel 1967: 37). Perhaps the charges included the relation maintained with 
Iuba as enemy and high treason implemented thereby. At the same time, it should be 
12 Cassius Dio, Historia Romana 43, 12, 3.
13 Bellum Africanum 95.
14 Cicero, Pro Ligario 19.
15 Cicero, Epistulae ad familiares 6, 13, 1; 6, 14, 1.
16 Cicero, Epistulae ad familiares 7, 7, 6; 6, 12, 2.
17 Ibid. 6, 13, 2.
18 Ibid. 6, 13, 3.
19 Ibid. 6, 13, 4.
20 Ibid. 6, 14.
21 Cic. fam. 6, 14, 2. 
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mentioned at the outset that in Pro Ligario delivered in October on the Forum Cicero did 
not touch on the legally relevant charges, however, by his speech – his speech made before 
the general public for the fi rst time in the period following the civil war – he seemingly 
legitimised Caesar’s dictatorship (Walser 1959: 90).
The defence was provided by C. Vibius Pansa, one of Caesar’s closest men – governor 
of Bithynia and Pontus in 47 and 46, governor of Gallia Cisalpina in 45, then, on Caesar’s 
proposal, consul designatus of the year 43, together with A. Hirtius – and by Cicero. 
Regarding the progress of the case it is worth mentioning Plutarch’s account.22 Thus, 
Plutarch presumed that the outcome of the proceedings had been determined right from the 
outset, namely, it was a decided fact for Caesar that Ligarius was guilty and would be 
convicted and it was only the power of Cicero’s eloquence that turned the fl ow of events. 
Caesar’s pardon produced its effect: in March 44 Ligarius was one of Caesar’s assassins,23 
then he and his family became the victim of the proscriptiones ordered by Antonius and 
Octavianus (Walser 1959: 93).
It is a fact that Caesar pardoned Ligarius and let him return to Italy, however, the 
following doubts arise with regard to Plutarch’s version24  (Kumaniecki 1967: 440 ff.; 
Loutsch 1984: 98–110; Craig 1984: 193–199). If Caesar – as Cicero’s letter asserts – did 
not entertain hostile emotions against Ligarius, why did he allow the proceedings to take 
place? There might have been two reasons for that: he either wanted to infl ict punishment 
on Tubero or wanted to provide powerful propaganda for his own clementia by forgiveness. 
The intention to convict Ligarius is highly improbable since Cicero did not put forward any 
new charges that would not have been known to him at the time of writing his letter dated 
late November, describing Caesar’s intentions.25 Furthermore, Pansa, being the dictator’s 
confi dant, would not have undertaken the defence of Ligarius, if it had been decided from 
the outset that he was guilty, and Caesar would not have assigned defence to Pansa, if he 
had not wanted to give pardon to Ligarius (Rochlitz 1993: 118). Caesar was very much 
aware that Ligarius did not have great infl uence among Pompey’s adherents and that the 
events in Africa were controlled by Varus, Cato, Matellus and Labieus. By that Caesar 
wanted to send a message to Attius Varus and Labienus fi ghting in Hispania: they had not 
lost all of their chances for settling the confl ict with as little blood sacrifi ce as possible 
(Walser 1959: 95).
It seems to be more probable that Caesar decided to acquit Ligarius in order to prove 
his by then proverbial generosity again. Yet, it was just the appearance of this intention that 
had to be avoided by all means: as Caesar had no other purpose by the proceedings than 
have his clementia celebrated through acquitting Ligarius, for this reason, he put on the 
mask of the angry judge having been already convinced of Ligarius’s depravity who could 
be moved by Cicero’s eloquence only (Kumaniecki  1967: 442). Caesar as a master of 
political propaganda must have gladly grasped the opportunity offered for playing the role 
that his clementia was brought to the surface and shaped Ligarius’s fate favourably owing 
to the effi cient oration of the counsel for the defence only (Kumaniecki  1967: 439). It 
cannot be ruled out that for Caesar – using Cicero’s role taking for his own goals – the 
Ligarius case might have also served to enable him to convince those of his adherents who 
22 Plutarchus, Cicero 39, 5–6.
23 Plutarchus, Brutus 11.
24 Ibid. 94.
25 Cic. fam. 6, 14.
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considered the scope of pardon granted by him excessive that both his more moderate and 
forgiving adherents and his defeated opponents agreed with the main line of his politics 
(McDermott 1970: 327; Drumann–Groebe 1899–1929: III. 636 ff.; VI. 232 ff.; Rochlitz 
1993: 119).
Regarding this view Wilhelm Drumann does not qualify Cicero’s role specifi cally, yet, 
knowing his damning judgement on the orator-statesman he could not have formed a 
positive picture of it since elsewhere – very much in bad faith – he presents Cicero as an 
extremely vain fi gure who overestimates himself, is heated by the desire to be in the public 
eye, lacks clear political vision, and overtly humbles to potentes (Drumann–Groebe 1899–
1929: III. 63). The question can be estimated with greater subtlety from the works of 
Matthias Gelzer and Justinus Klass if we presume that Cicero, using Caesar’s propaganda, 
tried to realise his own program: the more supporters of Pompey were granted pardon, the 
more chances he could see for strengthening the situation of the optimates, which in the 
long run could make (could have made) it possible to restore the order of the state of the 
Republic. To this end, it was indispensable to force Caesar somehow to implement his 
announced fundamental principles (Klass 1939: 188 f.). Handling the situation required 
great sense of tactics, seeming subordination, internal resoluteness and external fl exibility 
from Cicero. Caesar’s later acts, the battle at Munda and Ides of March 44 proved that both 
Cicero and Caesar had wrongly surveyed the efforts of the other party and the political 
party (Walser 1959: 96).
Clementia showed towards Ligarius was addressed not only to Pompey’s adherents 
fi ghting against Caesar in Africa but also to those preparing for another war in Hispania, 
and Cicero’s participation in the proceedings provided suffi cient publicity for the case as 
well as the appearance of objectivity manifested by Caesar (McDermott 1970: 325). At the 
same time, Pro Ligario made it possible for Cicero – although it might have seemed to be 
shameless fl attery in the eye of the adherents of the Republic26 – to enforce his own political 
goals, i.e., to try to make the dictator committed to follow his conciliatory policy, and to 
fi nd as many causes for exculpation for the supporters of Pompey as possible (Kumaniecki 
1967: 453; Fuhrmann 1991: 34). Cicero, however, presumably – contrary to Gerold Walser’s 
view, who interprets the Ligarius case as demonstration of Cicero’s vanity and 
overestimation of his own role – took part in the play directed by Caesar not because he 
was driven by political blindness and hybris, as it were believing that by his orator’s 
ingenuity he could deceit and enchant the dictator’s clear political vision (Walser 1959: 96). 
Much rather his concerns formulated in the letter written to Servius Sulpicius Rufus were 
realised:27 again he was compelled to take a position and as it were became extortable – if 
we take his promises made to his friends who lost favour, e.g. Ligarius seriously (Rochlitz 
1993: 119).28 On the other hand, if he did not want to get again into open hostility with 
Caesar, he could not refuse to legitimise his peace policy by taking position, which policy 
most probably had some attraction for Cicero too since it was the only thing that could 
bring some kind of remedy for the empire having been exhausted in the civil war (Drumann–
Groebe 1899–1929: III. 637; Kumaniecki 1967: 457). Cicero was also as much of a political 
realist to size up that it was impossible to avoid public life turning into sheer anarchy 
without some kind of compromise between the parties. Yet, he did not let Caesar use his 
26 Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum 13, 20, 4.
27 Cicero, Epistulae ad familiares 4, 4, 4.
28 Cf. Ibid. 6, 13. 14; Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum 13, 20, 4.
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talent as unprincipled tool: in Pro Ligario he ceaselessly makes an effort to certify excusable 
errors of Pompey’s adherents and does not omit to criticise the dictator’s status and the 
general conditions of Rome (Rochlitz 1993: 120).
Regarding the procedure followed by Caesar, there are certain similarities with his 
conduct engaged when granting pardon to Marcellus. Caesar himself was also interested in 
calling Marcellus back from exile; on the one hand, he wanted to demonstrate his generosity 
again; and, on the other hand, he wanted to advance legitimisation of dictatorship by the 
fact that a fi rm adherent of the republic such as Marcellus also returned home and 
acquiesced in the changes in political conditions, and by accepting the pardon granted to 
him as it were acknowledged it. In spite of the fact that Marcellus’s homecoming was a 
previously resolved fact, the dictator’s propaganda was meant to create the impression that 
Caesar bowed to the senate’s request only when he called the republican Marcellus back 
from exile. Caesar’s father-in-law, Piso mentioned Marcellus’s name seemingly accidentally 
in his speech delivered in the senate,29 upon which Marcellus’s cousin with identical name30 
threw himself on the ground at Caesar’s feet to beg for pardon for his kin, then the senators 
also rose from their seat and asked Caesar to exercise mercy. The dictator, after having 
complained at length about Marcellus’s faults, seemingly utterly unexpectedly declared that 
he would not be averse to the wish of the senate. This was followed by noisy applause of 
the senate and Cicero’s speech, in which Cicero praised his human eminence. Presumably, a 
similar choreography can be observed in Ligarius’s case too. If Caesar had let Ligarius 
return home without special proceedings, he would have missed an important occasion to 
propagate his policy advocating conciliation. As a matter of fact, it is not possible to give an 
answer to the question whether Tubero had acted against Ligarius upon Caesar’s instruction 
or the dictator merely made use of the occasion being offered.
II
Pro Ligario raises several questions that can be answered with diffi culties. Why did Cicero 
not use the obvious argument in his statement of the defence that Ligarius’s independent 
power of decision was highly restricted in Africa since governance was in the hands of 
Varus and Cato, so it was not Ligarius on whom the alliance entered into with Iuba turned? 
Why did Cicero did not strive to refute the charges made by Tubero? Why did Cicero 
undertake the case although he otherwise maintained good relations with the Tuberos and 
almost none with the Ligarii? (Walser 1959: 93; McDermott 1970: 322.) Regarding the 
Ligarius case further questions arises: does the case under review constitute actual court 
proceedings, consequently, a real speech in court; did Caesar pass a judgment on Ligarius 
as a judge or not? Giving answer to these questions can possibly make further questions 
unimportant or no longer have a cause.
The communis opinio gives the answer yes; and there are actually certain arguments to 
support these presumptions. Cicero calls Tubero prosecutor and Ligarius the accused, and 
in both cases he uses the proper technical term: specifi cally that Ligarius is an accused who 
admits his guilt, that is, an accused that each prosecutor would want,31 and that Tubero 
29 Cicero, Epistulae ad familiares 4, 4, 3
30 Marcellus was the husband of Caesar’s granddaugther, Octavia.
31 Cicero, Pro Ligario 2. Habes igitur, Tubero, quod est accusatori maxime optandum, 
confi tentem reum…
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accuses a man who makes a confession or a man whose case – i.e. political record – is 
better than or at least the same as his.32 The charge is determined by Bauman as maiestas 
imminuta or as crimen maiestatis imminutae. The facts of the case that can be deduced from 
the described historical situation would have later belonged under lex Iulia maiestatis, and 
as this statute of Augustus repeats the elements of earlier legislation, it can be made 
probable that we can qualify Ligarius’s act treason (Baumann 1967: 142 ff.; Kunkel 1974: 
94 f.). On the other hand, it is important to add that the term maiestas does not occur at all 
in the entire Pro Ligario, and Cicero does not determine the legal nature of the charges 
either (Bringmann 1986: 73).
Also, it is against the concept of regular criminal action that the proceedings were 
conducted in the absence of the accused, i.e. Ligarius. Although Roman legal practice did 
not exclude conviction in absentia, however, the accused had to be called to appear before 
the law before commencement of the lawsuit (Mommsen 1899: 332 ff.). Ligarius did not 
get such summons, what is more, it is a cardinal point of his case that Caesar prohibited 
him to enter the territory of Italy. Furthermore, the lawsuit conducted due to maiestas 
imminuta would have belonged before the quaestio perpetua de maiestate set up by Sulla 
since Sulla’s court of justice reforms were not abrogated by Caesar, he changed only the 
lists that formed the basis of the scope of jurors and the scope of identity of jurors;33 this 
measure presumably constituted part of the reforms of the year 46. The proceedings, 
however, were conducted not before the quaestio de maiestate as it could be expected but 
before Caesar personally as judicial forum, in whose hands Ligarius’s fate was placed 
(Bringmann 1986: 75).
Similarly, it is against the validity of crimen maiestatis as a charge that the alliance 
entered into with Iuba, King of Numidia against Caesar would have been its implementation 
in practice34  (Neumeister 1964: 47; Kumaniecki 1967: 439). However, the fact of the 
alliance with Iuba was known to Caesar already at the time of granting pardon to Ligarius, 
after the battle at Thapsus, so a charge based thereon would not have brought anything new 
to the knowledge of the dictator (Rochlitz 1993: 117).
The interpretation provided by Theodor Mommsen offers a possible solution for these 
diffi culties; he asserts that the imperium of magistrates contains the right of the judge to 
pass a judgement in criminal proceedings too (Mommsen 1899: 35 ff.; Mommsen 1887–
1888: I. 126; II. 735). Although the power of administration of justice of the magistrate was 
restricted by the legal institution of provocatio ad populum, this did not apply to 
extraordinary imperia, that is, the decemvirate of the 5th century, the second triumvirate and 
the dictatura rei publicae constituendae (he ranks both Sulla’s and Caesar’s dictatorship 
under the latter) (Mommsen 1899: 35). This view is fundamentally shaken by Jochen 
Bleicken and Wolfgang Kunkel by stating that provocatio protected the Roman citizen from 
the unlawful coercitio (disciplinary power) of the magistrate, however, produced no 
infl uence at all on iudicatio (administration of criminal justice) activity (Bleicken 1975: 324 
f.; Kunkel 1962: 25 ff.). Caesar’s dictatorship does not mean extraordinary imperium in the 
sense interpreted by Theodor Mommsen since he never took the title dictator rei publicae 
constituendae (legibus scribundis) (Bringmann 1986: 75).
32 Ibid. 10. …arguis fatentem. Non est satis: accusas eum, qui causam habet aut, ut ego dico, 
meliorem quam tu, aut, ut vis, parem.
33 Cicero, Philippicae in Marcum Antonium 2, 3; Cassius Dio, Historia Romana 43, 25, 1.
34 Quintilianus, Institutio oratoria 11, 1, 80. 
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Even Theodor Mommsen refers to a single example of the application of this 
extraordinary punitive power only: Ligarius’s case (Mommsen 1887–1888: II. 735). He 
supports his statement by the lines of Pro Ligario which assert that the purpose of the 
prosecution is not to convict but to execute Q. Ligarius,35 and that this could not have been 
carried out by anybody in this form even under Sulla, who sentenced to death everybody 
whom he hated: since there the dictator himself gave orders to kill the person without 
anybody demanding it.36 To this Theodor Mommsen ties the following interpretation: the 
locus clearly proves that as a dictator Caesar passed a judgement over Ligarius as a judge 
and his competence was identical with that of Sulla (Mommsen 1887–1888: II. 735). It is 
just the punctum saliens, however, that the locus does not make clear, i.e. that in a criminal 
case Caesar exercised administration of justice as a magistrate; as Cicero’s reference applies 
to the proscriptiones carried out by Sulla and does not mean to state that Sulla would have 
had his enemies executed after lawful investigation and declaring their guilt. It is public 
knowledge that Sulla was empowered by lex Valeria to have Roman citizens executed 
arbitrarily, without lawful sentence.37 So, if Caesar’s powers, by which he decided the fate 
of Ligarius, was identical with that of Sulla, then we must draw the conclusion that he 
obtained unlimited power over the losers of civil war – this seems to be supported also by 
the comment made by Cassius Dio.38 
Let us again examine the sentence of Pro Ligario considered to be of key importance 
by Theodor Mommsen, by which he wants to prove that the Ligarius case was actually 
court proceedings, specifi cally that the purpose of the prosecution was not to convict but to 
execute Q. Ligarius.39 It is a fact that the purpose of each formal accusation is to convict the 
accused, in the present case, however, the opponent does not claim this, much rather to kill, 
execute Ligarius without any sentence. So, just as Sulla, Caesar can proceed against his 
enemies as he pleases, he is, however, characterised not by cruelty but by clementia, and it 
is just exercising this that Tubero wants to prevent him from. The outcome of the case was 
probably determined on the grounds of a scenario worked out in advance by Caesar, 
showing some similarities with the Marcellus case, specifi cally – in spite of the description 
provided by Plutarch – in favour of Ligarius. Regarding Plutarch’s description it is worth 
quoting William C. McDermott’s witty formulation word for word: “Thus, a sad picture of 
the orator emerges, no longer king of the courts, but courting a king” (McDermott 1970: 
324). As it is made clear by the events of the coming years: Cicero must have felt the same 
and did not forgive. The proceedings learned of from Pro Ligario cannot be considered a 
real criminal action because the decision was not in the hands of the quaestio de maiestate 
but in the hands of the dictator Caesar, who did not have any exceptional imperium that 
would have entitled him to pass a judgment on criminal cases affecting Roman citizens as a 
magistrate.
35 Cicero, Pro Ligario 11.
36 Ibid. 11–12.
37 Cicero, De legibus 1, 42; De lege agraria 3, 5.
38 Cassius Dio, Historia Romana 42, 10, 1.
39 Cicero, Pro Ligario 11. Non habet eam vim ista accusatio, ut Q. Ligarius condemnetur, sed 
necetur…
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III
The above is also supported by the form of the speech; Pro Ligario is a so-called deprecatio, 
which is a tool of infl uencing arbitrary decisions of persons exercising power rather than a 
tool of the defence in court of justice as it is also noted by the author of Auctor ad 
Herennium40 (Martin 1974: 28). So, if Cicero chose a form for his speech that could not be 
used in court proceedings,41 then this also makes it probable that in Ligarius’s case the 
dictator adopted decision not as a magistrate acting as a judge. The orator himself declares 
that he turns to Caesar not as a judge.42 Right at the beginning of the oration he emphasises 
that he considers his task is to raise Caesar’s compassion rather than refute the charges43 as 
most probably Pansa had already dealt with possible forms of refuting the charges 
(Kumaniecki 1967: 445). The purpose of deprecatio is not defensio facti, i.e. the defence of 
a given act but ignoscendi postulatio, i.e. praying for remission of punishment to be 
imposed due to a committed act or error.44 At the same time, it should be noted that Pro 
Ligario is not purely deprecatio but also a statement of the defence, as Cicero presents 
several fact-based arguments to defend Ligarius.45 The usual elements of deprecatio are 
commonplaces (loci communes) meant to evoke misericordia,46 so, for example, the 
audience’s sympathy can be aroused by referring to humanitas, fortuna, misericordia and 
rerum commutatio.47 Accordingly, deprecatio is not a genre of the court of justice, its scope 
of application is the senate and consilium – i.e. it must have been clear to the audience of 
the period that Cicero saw through the play of passing a judgment directed by Caesar and 
used it for his own benefi t (Rochlitz 1993: 121).
The logically and psychologically proper arrangement of arguments, as a matter of 
fact, constitutes a tense structure in Pro Ligario too, and, accordingly, the misericordia-
topoi fi lled with temper, meant to affect Caesar’s clementia, were placed in the speech 
consciously (Neumeister 1964: 71 ff.; Rochlitz 1993: 121). Already in the prooemium the 
orator makes it clear that he builds on Caesar’s misericordia,48 thus, he makes his audience 
aware of the fact that his purpose regarding Ligarius is not liberatio culpae since in his 
opinion his defendant has not committed crime by joining Pompey49 but errati venia, i.e. 
obtaining forgiveness for taking erroneous position.50 In accordance with that, the orator 
leads the thread of Tubero being a committed adherent of Pompey along the speech in order 
to reveal the real motivation of the accusation thereby.
40 Auctor ad Herennium 1, 14, 24. Cf. Cicero, De inventione 2, 104–108; Quintilianus, Institutio 
oratoria 5, 13, 5.
41 Cicero, De inventione 2, 104. ff.
42 Cicero, Pro Ligario 30. Causas, Caesar, egi multas equidem tecum, dum in foro tenuit ratio 
honorum tuorum, certe numquam hoc modo: ‘ignoscite, iudices; erravit, lapsus est, non putavit; si 
umquam posthac’, ad parentem sic agi solet … sed ego ad parentem loquor: erravit, temere fecit, 
paenitet; ad clementiam tuam confugio, delicti veniam peto, ut ignoscatur, oro
43 Ibid. 1.
44 Auctor ad Herennium 2, 25; Cicero, De inventione 1, 104.
45 Cicero, Pro Ligario 2–5. 20–22.
46 Auctor ad Herennium 2, 50; Cicero, De inventione 1, 106–109.
47 Auctor ad Herennium 2, 26.
48 Cicero, Pro Ligario 1.
49 Ibid. 17–19.
50 Ibid. 30.
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The narratio, which is emphatically meant to outline the facts without emotions,51 is 
followed by the argumantatio52 that – contrary to the orator’s promise – nevertheless serves 
the defence of Ligarius: especially the paragraphs contrasting the crudelitas of the Tuberos 
intending to restrict Caesar in exercising pardon with Ligarius’s begging and tears as well 
as with Caesar’s clementia, humanitas, misericordia and lenitas.53 By that he turns Caesar’s 
brightly gleaming clementia away from the prosecutors and as it were urges him to side 
with his defendant, and turns crudelitas that the Tuberos reproach Ligarius with around, 
and lets it fall back on the prosecutors (Neumeister 1964: 51; Rochlitz 1993: 122). He 
deprives Ligarius’s case of its individuality, and contrasts the general miseria of the civil 
war with misericordia showed by Caesar, general luctus with his lenitas, general crudelitas 
with the dictator’s clementia.54 The virtue of humanitas especially comes to the front for 
misericordia and clementia are its most beautiful forms of manifestation – since as 
Quintilianus expounds, it is just this that deprecatio intends to turn the attention of the 
target audience and the addressee of the speech to55 (Nybakken 1939: 398). By underlining 
Caesar’s well-known humanitas Cicero as it were obliges the dictator to adhere to enforcing 
this virtue,56 and reminds the Tuberos of studia humanitatis, which was once not alien to 
them either.57 By that he again sets Caesar and the wing of his party urging for conciliation 
against the Tuberos desiring petty-minded revenge.58
He makes it as it were obligatory for Caesar to keep to his principles formulated in his 
own propaganda since misericordia and lenitas are virtues frequently voiced during the 
civil war too; his humanitas can be certifi ed by his adherents and his clementia by the 
whole empire. By all that Cicero uses the key features of Caesar’s self image as a tool for 
strengthening deprecatio (Rochlitz 1993: 123). The following passages shed light on the 
purpose of these paragraphs heavily charged with emotions.59 Here he tries to clear Ligarius 
of the scelus that even after Pompey’s death he continued to fi ght against Caesar in alliance 
with the ruler of Numidia, Iuba, who was offi cially declared enemy by the senate by then 
having sided with the dictator (Kumaniecki 1967: 442 ff.). It was just this difference, i.e. 
remaining loyal to Pompey even after his death, that the prosecutors wanted to emphasise 
and thereby to take the most important argument, i.e. that the Tuberos also fought on the 
side of Pompey, away from the defence (Bringmann 1986: 79). In other words, the function 
of this part of the argumentatio highly charged with emotions is to win the dictator’s 
sympathy for the benefi t of Ligarius and at the same time to help the orator to get over the 
pitfalls of his argumentation expounded regarding the desperate Pompeian position of the 
accused, while driving the attention of the audience and Caesar away from its logical 
pitfalls (Rochlitz 1993: 123).
The heightening of emotions and temper reaches its climax in peroratio: Caesar can 
have no other choice than exercise the virtue of clementia.60 He repeats that his speech had 
51 Ibid. 2–5.
52 Ibid. 6–29.
53 Ibid. 11–16.
54 Cicero, Pro Ligario 14. f.
55 Quintilianus, Institutio oratoria 5, 13, 7. 
56 Cicero, Pro Ligario 16.
57 Ibid. 12.
58 Ibid. 15.
59 Cicero, Pro Ligario 17–19.
60 Cicero, Pro Ligario 29–38.
117HANDLING OF FACTS IN CICERO’S SPEECH IN DEFENCE OF QUINTUS LIGARIUS
no other goal than to produce effect on the dictator’s humanitas, clementia and misericordia, 
however, within the frameworks of praeteritio he does not omit to mention that he tried to 
refute the charges against Ligarius by fact-based arguments too61 (Neumeister 1964: 54). 
The task of peroratio is commovere, the effect produced on the decision-maker’s emotions,62 
and in the case of deprecatio this aspect is reinforced because the orator underlines several 
elements from Ligarius’s personality and deeds that were to move Caesar’s emotions. So, 
for example, he stresses that his deeds were moved not by hatred against Caesar,63 that he 
badly tolerates being far away from his brothers,64 that he stayed in Africa not upon his own 
resolution but by being prevented by the storms of danger-fraught times of the civil war,65 
and that Ligarius’s family had obtained several merits with regard to Caesar.66 He points out 
that many people from all over Italy appeared in mourning to beg for Ligarius.67 He refers 
to the pardon granted earlier by the dictator to others,68 Caesar’s clementia,69 misericordia,70 
humanitas,71 liberalitas,72 bonitas,73 and crowns all that by the praise that mortals having 
mercy on their fellow beings become similar to gods.74 So, the orator used all the available 
tools of deprecatio, not omitting, beside ignoscendi postulatio, defensio facti either – 
thereby, albeit, accepting the choreography set up by Caesar, using his clementia- and 
misericordia-propaganda for the benefi t of his defendant (Rochlitz 1993: 124).
IV
In Pro Ligario both the term clementia75 and misericordia76 occur six times, and so rise to 
the most important form of conduct, feature demanded from and attributed in advance to 
Caesar. Here clementia means forgiving for error,77 which Caesar is required to do in his 
capacity as father78 – stressing father’s characteristic is perhaps reference to the parens 
patriae title79 (Fuhrmann 1963: 508). So, the conduct arising from clementia is ignoscere,80 
that is, contrary to Pro Marcello, here clementia is shifted from the concept of temperantia 
animi towards the meaning mercy (Rochlitz 1993: 125). At the same time, ignoscere is 
61 Ibid. 29. 
62 Cicero, Partitiones oratoriae 15; Pro Milone 92; Pro Sulla 92. f.; Pro Cluentio 202; Pro 
Caelio 79. f.
63 Cicero, Pro Ligario 30.
64 Ibid. 33.
65 Ibid. 34.
66 Ibid. 35. f.
67 Ibid. 32. f.
68 Ibid. 30.
69 Ibid. 29–30.
70 Ibid. 29. 37.
71 Ibid. 29.
72 Ibid. 31.
73 Ibid. 37.
74 Ibid. 38. 
75 Cicero, Pro Ligario 6. 10. 15. 19. 29. 30.
76 Ibid. 1. 14. 15. 16. 29. 37.
77 Ibid. 17–19. 30.
78 Ibid. 30.
79 Cf. Appianus, Bella civilia 2, 106. 144. 442. 602; Cassius Dio, Historia Romana 44, 4, 4. 
80 Cicero, Pro Ligario 13. 14. 15. 16. 29. 30.
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suitable for expressing humanitas,81 misericordia82 and clementia83 and thereby the border 
between these concepts and virtues fades away, and misericordia and clementia become the 
form of manifestation of humanitas Caesaris.84 To achieve this goal, i.e. the pardon to be 
obtained for Ligarius, the orator, acknowledging the dictator’s superiority, praises Caesar’s 
clementia and in his view he deserves praise primarily because after his victory he did not 
keep this virtue out of the reach of his enemies either,85 which is a suffi cient cause for his 
former enemies evaluating and experiencing his victory as benefi t too.86
By praising Caesar’s clementia he introduces the part in which he speaks about his 
own former hostile emotions towards Caesar87 in order to make capital of it for his 
defendant: Ligarius is more worthy of Caesar’s clementia than the orator himself because 
the former has never been hostile to Caesar, his unpleasant situation can be traced back to 
the unfortunate interplay of circumstances rather than to his own conviction. By that Cicero 
dresses his own Pompey supporter past in the cloak of praise of Caesar to overcome the 
dictator’s antipathy. At the same time he expresses his conviction that if the leaders of the 
opposition in Hispania accept the opportunity of peace offered by Caesar, they will not 
become disloyal to their ideas, instead, they follow the command of common sense – it is, 
of course, a question whether Cicero’s argument, to be more precise, his personality seemed 
to be authentic in their eyes since they could have possibly considered the orator a traitor.88
As a matter of fact, it is undecided how much the praise of Caesar’s clementia came 
from Cicero’s heart as – in spite of the fact that this time to serve the peace of the community 
he let himself be used as the tool of Caesar’s propaganda – internal reservations and 
questioning of the superiority of the one-time equal rival could not have vanished without 
any traces from Cicero’s soul. Reference to Caesar as father89 and denial of the effect his 
own orator’s performance produced on Caesar’s decision90 perhaps did not lack ironic 
overtones (Rochlitz 1993: 126; on the other hand see Walser 1960: 96). Cicero was not 
likely to have acknowledged the legitimacy of the situation deep inside as he did not give 
up his ideal of the republican state, yet, he did not openly give voice to his bitterness and 
criticism, he dressed his conviction in an ambiguous form91 (Bringmann 1986: 80; Loutsch 
1984: 98 ff.). If Caesar wanted to disguise the trial of Ligarius as offi cial court proceedings, 
then it can be considered delicate irony masked as fl attery on Cicero’s side to refer to the 
dictator as pater thereby depriving him of his capacity as judge (Bringmann 1980: 80). He 
must have chosen deprecatio as the genre of his speech for similar reasons, which is 
obviously not a genre of court of justice, and, accordingly, neither aequitas, nor iustitia are 
mentioned in the speech. On the other hand, in spite of slight criticism and irony by which 
81 Cicero, Pro Ligario 13. 14. 16.
82 Ibid. 14. 15.
83 Ibid. 15. 30.
84 Ibid. 30. 
85 Ibid. 10. 
86 Ibid. 19. 
87 Ibid. 6.
88 Cf. Plutarchus, Cicero 39; Cato minor 54; Cicero, Epistulae as familiares 7, 3, 6; Epistulae 
as Atticum 11, 7, 3; Pro Marcello 18.
89 Cicero, Pro Ligario 30.
90 Ibid. 31. 38.
91 Cf. Cicero, Pro Ligario 7. 13. 18. 19. 33. 
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he addresses Caesar’s public law position, to obtain clementia and misericordia he uses the 
dictator’s propagandistic concepts for his own purposes (Rochlitz 1993: 126 f.).
The concept of sapientia occurs only once in the entire speech and – just as in Pro 
Marcello – is used as the synonym of political consideration and common sense.92 The 
concept of consilium also occurs only once in Pro Ligario and refers both to Caesar and 
Pompey, and in a negative sense, specifi cally, with respect to upsetting public order.93 It is 
due to the different objectives of the two orations that sapientia as the central concept of 
Pro Marcello is thrust into the background. An oratio every time serves utile: the primary 
objective of Pro Marcello is to outline the future of the public under the rule of Caesar as 
primus inter pares, the function of Pro Ligario is to acquit his defendant and to obtain 
pardon for him. While in Pro Marcello – as its theme covers general political issues – 
clementia Caesaris is thrust into the background, Pro Ligario deals with the fate of a single 
person, for this reason the virtue of clementia comes to the front (Rochlitz 1993: 127). At 
the same time – as Pro Ligario serves to break the opposition in Hispania and to support 
Caesar’s propaganda aimed at conciliation to be made with his enemies fi ghting there – for 
this objective the image of Caesar clemens is more suitable than the image of Caesar 
sapiens, who is willing to let bygones be bygones and forgive. Compared to Marcellus, 
Ligarius’s political weight is rather low – which cannot be necessarily said of Marcellus – 
so it is not specially humiliating for Cicero to ask for pardon for an enemy who has been 
much below Caesar from the outset. The oration made in favour of Marcellus was delivered 
in the senate; consequently, it was also a warning addressed to the senators of the need of 
reconciliation for the sake of common good – so, sapientia was the key concept that 
connected the audience, i.e. Caesar and the senators. On the contrary, Pro Ligario was 
delivered on the Forum and the audience was the populus Romanus – so, Cicero thought it 
was more expedient to put this key word of people’s party politics in the centre.94 Between 
the orations the political climate in Rome had signifi cantly changed as a result of Caesar’s 
conduct, which left its mark on Cicero’s frame of mind sensitive of delicate vibrations 
(McDermott 1970: 337). At the same time, Pro Ligario lacks the cautious optimism of Pro 
Marcello – in the meantime Caesar’s triumph had taken place – as if Cicero had given up 
hope that Caesar sapiens would restore res publica, and trustful tone is replaced by irony 
(Gelzer 1960: 265).
V
William C. McDermott – just as Cicero himself – does not consider Pro Ligario a fi rst-rate 
masterpiece of the orator; yet, he points out that in using irony it has an outstanding place in 
the orator’s lifework (McDermott 1970: 327 ff.; Haury 1955: 185 f.; Canter 1936: 457–464; 
Drumann–Groebe 1899–1929: III. 637). It is not by chance that it is quoted by Quintilian, 
who based his textbook on rhetoric mostly on Cicero whom he enthusiastically respected,95 
and from among Cicero’s fi fty-two orations quoted by him, he refers most frequently, after 
Pro Cluentio (sixty-seven quotations) and Pro Milone (sixty-seven quotations), to Pro 
Ligario (fi fty-three quotations), which is highly noteworthy as contrary to the two hundred 
92 Cicero, Pro Ligario 6.
93 Ibid. 19.
94 Cicero, Pro Ligario 6. 37.
95 Cf. Quintilianus, Institutio oratoria 10, 1, 112. 
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and two paragraphs of Pro Cluentio and one hundred and fi ve paragraphs of Pro Milone, 
Pro Ligario consists of merely thirty-eight paragraphs. They are followed in order of 
reference by Pro Murena (twenty-fi ve quotations), Pro Caelio (twenty-two quotations), the 
second Philippica (twenty quotations) and the fi rst speech against Catilina (fourteen 
quotations). In contrast, the fourth speech against Catilina, Pro rege Deiotaro, De imperio 
Cnaei Pompei, the ninth Philippic, Pro Sestio and the fi rst Verrine oration are quoted only 
once in each case by Quintilian, and he does not refer to Pro Sulla, De provinciis 
consularibus and the fi rst Philippica at all. Regarding Pro Ligario Quintilian calls the 
attention to masterly handling of the facts of the case and exemplary use of irony.96 Thus, 
Quintilian considered Pro Ligario, unique of its kind, a work of outstanding signifi cance in 
training rhetoric (McDermott 1970: 336).
In the peroratio of Pro Ligario, with huge pathos Cicero enumerates the notables of 
the order of knighthood who appeared in mourning clothes before Caesar, the people of the 
house of the Brocchi, L. Marcius, C. Caesetius and L. Corfi dius.97 The latter, for that matter, 
could not be present when the speech was delivered as by then he was dead98 – this error 
also proves that Cicero could not be directly acquainted with Ligarius and his family: most 
probably he had never seen the person mentioned by him but, as he was unknown, his 
absence could not be noticed by many people. This pathetic enumeration of the “notables” 
constitutes powerful contrast with Caesar, L. Tubero and Pansa, and it becomes clear that 
Ligarius himself was the least important in the lawsuit. The use of pathos in this form, 
without cause and therefore turning into the opposite must have made Caesar – and deep 
inside certainly Cicero himself – smile (McDermott 1970: 337).
Certain sentences of the oration had a clear meaning to the audience, for example, the 
point where Cicero describes that all of them threw themselves to the ground at Caesar’s 
feet begging for pardon – including the orator himself.99 In the account written to Ligarius 
Cicero depicted that the brothers and relatives of the accused threw themselves to the 
ground at Caesar’s feet and that he spoke in accordance with the case and Ligarius’s 
situation.100 The audience might have taken Cicero’s words literally; the dictator, however, 
could remember well that Cicero had not thrown himself to the ground at his feet – to what 
extent Caesar might have taken this phrase as irony cannot be known. Calling the four years 
younger Caesar pater has again certain troublesome overtones.101 According to Dio Cassius, 
Caesar was granted the title parens patriae in 44,102 and albeit it took place two years after 
Pro Ligario was delivered, the intitulatio must have become public knowledge earlier 
(McDermott 1970: 338). To address Caesar pater could not be easy for Cicero as it was him 
who was given the title pater patriae in 63 by the senate, on the initiation of Q. Lutatius 
Catulus, for exposing and suppressing Catilina’s plot; also, it is undecided how much this 
address sounded authentic or ironic from Cicero’s mouth to the ear of either the audience or 
Caesar (Alföldi 1953: 103 ff.).
Two paragraphs of the oration with clearly demonstrable ironic references and 
overtones deserve more profound analysis. In the seventh paragraph Cicero relates that after 
96 Ibid. 4, 1, 38–39; 4, 1, 70; 9, 2, 29. 50. 
97 Cicero, Pro Ligario 33.
98 Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum 13, 44, 3.
99 Cicero, Pro Ligario 13. 
100 Cicero, Epistulae ad familiares 6, 14, 2.
101 Cicero, Pro Ligario 30.
102 Cassius Dio, Historia Romana 44, 4, 44; 44, 48, 3.
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the war had begun and had been mostly fought, he, free from any restraint, upon his own 
decision, joined the army that took up arms against Caesar. He admits that he is saying all 
that before the man who, although being aware of this, returned him to the state before they 
ever met; who sent him a letter from Egypt telling him to stay who he was; who, although 
being the Roman people’s only imperator in the whole empire, let him be the other one (and 
news on that was brought by Pansa); who allowed him to keep the bundle of sticks decorated 
with laurel as long as he wanted; and who believed that he would save the orator indeed if 
he did all that without depriving him of any of his titles.103 At fi rst hearing or reading, 
Cicero’s words seem fl attering effusions, which Caesar was not in want of these days; yet, 
even if nobody else did, the dictator certainly discovered the irony hidden between the 
lines. It is worth comparing the content exposed here with Cicero’s letters written in the 
relevant period between November 48 and August 47, primarily to Atticus.
The fi rst sentence of the paragraph seems to be true, however, the fi ve elements 
following it need to be analysed more profoundly. The statement on pardon granted by 
Caesar is true as on 17 December 48 Caesar gave instructions to Dolabella to write a letter 
to Cicero: he may return to Italy. This permit had signifi cance because M. Antonius as 
magister equitum banned Cicero by name from Italy.104 When in August 47 Cicero received 
Caesar’s letter, he was unable to decide how much he could rely on what was written in it 
and how secure returning would be.105 Only the meeting at the end of September 47 
convinced Cicero that he could leave Brundisium and return home. In other words, only 
after the meeting did Caesar give him back to the state. In those days Cicero wrote several 
letters to Caesar’s infl uential men, so, among others, to Balbus and Oppius106 and Caesar 
himself, and in this letter he tried to fi nd excuses for his brother, Quintus for joining 
Pompey.107 Although on 12th August 47 Cicero received a highly generous letter (litterae 
satis liberales) from Caesar, he gave an account of this to Terentia, yet – as it has been 
already mentioned – this did not dispel his fears.108 It is not probable that this writing 
referred to in a somewhat cold tone is identical with the letter written from Egypt that was 
mentioned in the letter. Thus, there is a good chance of presuming that the letter from Egypt 
is mere fi ction and Caesar could be very much aware of that too. The bundle of sticks 
decorated with laurel as badges of power and the person of Pansa are referred to only once 
but not at the same place in the correspondence from this period,109 however, without the 
additional information provided in Pro Ligario. Most probably it was Caesar and Pansa 
who were surprised the most at the news purportedly brought by Pansa – and disclosed by 
Cicero (McDermott 1970: 341).
The statement that Caesar offered Cicero imperator’s offi ce was probably based on the 
presumption that even at their meeting in September 47 Caesar made an attempt at winning 
Cicero over to supporting his politics, Cicero, however, refused to take part actively in 
public matters.110 It was always Caesar’s more or less confessed yet never actually realised 
desire to win the support and acknowledgement of older senators in higher ranks – and 
103 Cicero, Pro Ligario 7. 
104 Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum 11, 7, 2.
105 Cf. Cicero, Epistulae ad familiares 14, 23; Epistulae ad Atticum 11, 20–22.
106 Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum 11, 6, 3.
107 Ibid. 11, 12, 1–2.
108 Cicero, Epistulae ad familiares 14, 23.
109 Cf. Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum 11, 7, 2; 11, 6, 3.
110 Cf. Cicero, Epistulae ad familiares 9, 17, 3.
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Cicero had a special place among those whose sympathy he tried to obtain. In 60, by the 
mediation of Balbus, Caesar offered Cicero the opportunity of joining the fi rst triumvirate,111 
and in July 59 he urged him to accept the offi ce of legate in Gallia offered by him,112 which 
Cicero again refused.113 In March 49 Caesar as imperator sent a letter to Cicero, whom he 
addressed also by the title of imperator, in order to win his support but he did not succeed.114 
All this clearly proves that Caesar judged Cicero’s infl uence in public matters and the moral 
weight of his political standpoint both more favourably and more realistically than several 
modern historians (McDermott 1970: 342).
Taking all the above into consideration, we can presume that Caesar had the meeting 
with Cicero in Brundisium organised for a defi nite cause,115 and for such a cause that he did 
not want to disclose in a letter. With good sense William C. McDermott makes it probable 
that he wanted to entrust Cicero as magister equitum to administer Italy for the period of 
time while he was busy with the campaign in Africa; he probably offered him, owing to his 
activity in Cilicia, the opportunity to retain the triumph that Cicero had longed for,116 
likewise the status of patrician, which he later granted to several people,117 for example, to 
Octavianus too,118 and, in his absence, the rank of princeps/primus rogatus in the senate, 
which Cicero most probably enjoyed as senator consularis in 62 and 60. If Cicero had 
accepted this invitation, beside the unus imperator he would have been alter imperator 
indeed (McDermott 1970: 343).
Modern historiography has often tried to doubt Cicero’s practical skills in public 
administration/politics, in spite of his successful activity as proquaestor, consul in Sicily 
and proconsul in Cilicia. That Caesar had much better opinion of Cicero’s qualities is 
proved by his offers repeated several times. In 47 the opportunities offered by Caesar would 
have raised Cicero again to the forefront of politics, on the one hand, and, would have 
posed him a worthy challenge that he would have been able to meet properly, on the other 
– however, he was far from being so uninhibited, opportunist, thirsty of power and glory as 
his Antique and modern critics would like to present him. Probably listening to his inner 
conviction, Cicero refused the offered post – which he gave no account of either to Atticus 
or anybody else – and told his friends no more than Caesar had provided him with the 
opportunity of returning home.119 Although in a negative context, Dio Cassius brings up 
that Cicero had not become magister equitum.120 Also, Dio Cassius puts the statement into 
Q. Fufi us Calenus’s mouth that Cicero, after having been granted pardon and patrician’s 
rank by Caesar – the latter statement is obviously not true – he ungratefully assassinated 
him; not himself but by instigating others to commit the assassination.121 These two loci 
clearly supports that Caesar might have made an offer with this kind of content to Cicero in 
order to win his support, and, nevertheless, news about this must have somehow leaked out 
111 Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum 2, 3, 3. f. 
112 Ibid. 2, 19, 5.
113 Cicero, De provinciis consularibus 41.
114 Cf. Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum 9, 6a, 1.
115 Cf. Plutarchus, Cicero 39, 3–4.
116 Cf. Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum 8, 3, 6.
117 Cassius Dio, Historia Romana 43, 47, 4.
118 Ibid. 45, 2, 7.
119 Ibid. 344.
120 Cassius Dio, Historia Romana 46, 12, 4.
121 Ibid. 46, 23, 3.
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from their meeting in Brundisium.122 Thus, we have to declare that a part of the statements 
made by Cicero in the seventh paragraph is no more than pure fi ction – but the reference to 
the opportunity that Caesar offered him the offi ce of alter imperator can be possibly true.
In summary it is worth paying some attention to the beginning of the peroratio of Pro 
Ligario, in which, albeit in hidden form, Cicero throws light upon the illegitimateness of 
Caesar’s power and clementia.123 In the thirty-third paragraph Cicero relates that Caesar 
declared: the opposing party – that is, Pompey’s adherents – considered everybody who 
was not with them enemy, however, he considers everybody who is not against him his own 
adherent.124 This clearly reveals the contrast between the characters of Caesar and Pompey 
of which Cicero already spoke about in Pro Marcello too, specifi cally that in case of 
Pompey’s victory even his own adherents were afraid of the blood bath that Pompey had 
announced in advance.125 Caesar (just because of his often praised clementia) wanted to 
implement quite the contrary: as Cicero notes after the dictator’s death, he hamstrung/
obliged his enemies by the appearance of mercy/temperance.126 Yet, from this passage of 
Pro Ligario, even if nobody else did, Caesar could hear irony: Pompey could allow himself 
to make this statement because with proper legitimisation, on the grounds of the 
authorisation of the senate he fought for maintaining the lawful order of the state whereas 
Caesar, who set the aim of overthrowing the order of the state, that is, as an illegitimate 
imperator was compelled to give evidence of clementia.
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